September 11, 2001 Research & Archives

Hijackers in a Dulles Airport, Washington, security checkpoint, from left to right: Nawaf Alhazmi gets searched, Khalid Almihdhar, and Hani Hanjour. [Source: FBI]

Around 7:15 a.m., Flight 77 hijackers Majed Moqed and Khalid Almihdhar check in at the American Airlines ticket counter at Washington's Dulles  International Airport. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 2-3; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 27) The FAA has a computer system in place, called CAPPS, which identifies those passengers most likely requiring additional scrutiny by airport security (see (6:20 a.m.-7:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001). CAPPS selects both men, but the only consequence is that Moqed's luggage is not loaded onto Flight 77 until after his boarding is confirmed. (9/11 Commission 1/27/2004; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 27-28) Dulles Airport has surveillance cameras monitoring its security checkpoints, and video later viewed by the 9/11 Commission shows the two passing through the Main Terminal's west security screening checkpoint at 7:18 a.m.

When they go through, their carry-on bags fail to set off any alarms, but both men set off the alarm when they pass through the first metal detector. They are directed to a second metal detector, where Almihdhar passes, but Moqed fails again. He is subjected to a personal screening with a metal detection hand wand. This time he is cleared and permitted to pass through the checkpoint. (9/11 Commission 1/27/2004; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 3) The other three Flight 77 hijackers pass through the security checkpoint about 20 minutes later (see (7:25 a.m.-7:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission later concludes that Almihdhar's passport was "suspicious" and could have been linked to al-Qaeda, but it does not explain why or how. (Sullivan 1/27/2004)

General Henry Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, takes off to fly to Europe for a NATO conference, and will therefore be away from the US when the 9/11 terrorist attacks occur. (Giesemann 2008, pp. 20, 22; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell 2010, pp. 430-433)

Shelton is scheduled to attend a meeting of the Military Committee—NATO's highest military authority—in Budapest, Hungary, on September 12, to discuss the situation in the Balkans, the European Security and Defense Identity, and NATO's new force structure. On his return journey, he is set to stop in London, Britain, to be knighted by the Queen. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 9/10/2001; North Atlantic Treaty Organization 9/11/2001; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell 2010, pp. 430)

Shelton takes off from Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, DC, on a specially modified C-135 (the military version of a Boeing 707) nicknamed "Speckled Trout." Normally he flies on a VIP Boeing 757 often used by the vice president, but that aircraft is presently unavailable, so he is flying instead on the C-135, which is usually reserved for the Air Force chief of staff. Those accompanying Shelton on the flight include his wife, Carolyn; his executive assistant, Colonel Doug Lute; his aides, Master Sergeant Mark Jones and Lieutenant Commander Suzanne Giesemann; and his personal security agent, Chief Warrant Officer Marshall McCants. (Giesemann 2008, pp. 20-22; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell 2010, pp. 431, 434)

When Shelton is out of the country, General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is designated by law as acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his place. Shelton will later recall, "Until I crossed back into United States airspace, all the decisions would be [Myers's] to make, in conjunction with Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld and the president." (Myers 2009, pp. 10; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell 2010, pp. 432)

After learning of the attacks in New York, Shelton will give the order for his plane to return to the US (see (8:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Giesemann 2008, pp. 22-23; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell 2010, pp. 431)

However, the plane will repeatedly be denied permission to enter US airspace (see (After 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and will only land back in the US at 4:40 p.m. (see 4:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). Shelton will only arrive at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon an hour after that (see 5:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). (Federal Aviation Administration 9/11/2001 pdf file; Myers 2009, pp. 159; McCullough 9/2011 pdf file)

According to the 9/11 Commission, between 7:03 a.m. and 7:39 a.m. the four alleged Flight 93 hijackers check in at the United Airlines ticket counter at Newark (New Jersey) Liberty International Airport. Only Ahmad Alhaznawi is selected for additional scrutiny by airport security under the FAA's CAPPS program (see (6:20 a.m.-7:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The only consequence is that his checked bag is screened for explosives, and not loaded onto the plane until it is confirmed that he has boarded. (9/11 Commission 1/27/2004; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 4; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 35) On their way to boarding the plane, all four would pass through a security checkpoint, which has three walk-through metal detectors, two X-ray machines, and explosive trace detection equipment. (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 97) The 9/11 Commission later claims Newark Airport has no video cameras monitoring its security checkpoints, so there is no documentary evidence showing when the hijackers passed through the checkpoint or what alarms may have been triggered. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 4; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 35) However, Michael Taylor, the president of a security company, who has done consulting work for the New York Port Authority (which operates the airport), claims that Newark does use security cameras at the time of 9/11. (Hanchett and Washington 9/29/2001) All of the screeners on duty at the checkpoint are subsequently interviewed, and none report anything unusual or suspicious having occurred. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 4; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 35) The 9/11 Commission later concludes that the passports of Ahmad Alhaznawi and fellow Flight 93 hijacker Ahmed Alnami have suspicious indicators and could have been linked to al-Qaeda, but it does not elaborate on this. (Sullivan 1/27/2004)

Sometime during this period, the 9/11 hijackers pass through airport security checkpoints at the various airports. The FAA has a screening program in place called the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS). CAPPS automatically targets passengers for additional screening based on suspicious behavior such as buying one-way tickets or paying with cash. If a passenger is selected, their bags are thoroughly screened for explosives, but their bodies are not searched. (Goo and Eggen 1/28/2004)

CAPPS selects three of the five Flight 11 hijackers. Since Waleed Alshehri checked no bags, his selection had no consequences. Wail Alshehri and Satam Al Suqami have their bags scanned for explosives, but are not stopped. No Flight 175 hijackers are selected. Only Ahmed Alhaznawi is selected from Flight 93. His bag is screened for explosives, but he is not stopped. The 9/11 Commission later concludes that Alhaznawi and Ahmed Alnami, also headed to Flight 93, have suspicious indicators and that they could have been linked to al-Qaeda upon inspection, but it has not been explained why or how. (9/11 Commission 1/27/2004; Sullivan 1/27/2004)

Screening of the Flight 77 hijackers is described below.

New York City's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) set up at Pier 92 on the Hudson River following the 9/11 attacks. [Source: ArcNews]

At Pier 92 on the Hudson River, preparations are underway for a training exercise due to take place there the following day. The exercise, called Tripod, which had been scheduled months earlier, is intended to test how well New York's Office of Emergency Management (OEM) can administer treatment in response to a biological-terrorism attack (see September 12, 2001). (Griscom 10/15/2001; Giuliani 2002, pp. 355) Pier 92, located just over four miles north-northwest of the World Trade Center, has been set up as a model distribution station where the simulated victims will be treated. (Jenkins and Edwards-Winslow 9/2003, pp. 15 and 20)

Ken Longert, the owner of a theatrical lighting business, arrives at the pier at 7:00 a.m. to help get the place ready for the exercise. He will later recall, "Two or three hundred cadets [presumably with the New York police and fire departments] were there, learning the proper procedures in case some kind of disaster hit New York." Longert will recall that, seconds after the second WTC tower is hit at 9:03, "all the people from OEM disappeared" from the pier. (DiMarco 2007, pp. 457-458) After OEM's original command center is destroyed when WTC 7—where it is located—collapses (see (5:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001), Pier 92 will be selected as the location for the substitute command center. (9/11 Commission 5/19/2004) Members of OEM staff have also arrived early this morning at the OEM offices in WTC 7 to prepare for the exercise (see 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). (Jenkins and Edwards-Winslow 9/2003, pp. 15)

Jackie Chan. [Source: Reuters]

A scene for a Hollywood movie about a terrorist plot to blow up the World Trade Center was originally scheduled to be filmed at the top of one of the Twin Towers at this time, but the filming has been canceled because the script for the scene is late to arrive. (ABC News 9/19/2001; Empire 9/19/2001; Moore 9/27/2002) The action-comedy movie, titled Nosebleed, which was written in 1999 (see February 1999-September 11, 2001), is set to feature the well-known martial artist and actor Jackie Chan as a window washer at the WTC who uncovers a terrorist plot to bomb the Twin Towers. (Carver and Petrikin 2/7/1999; Jensen and Svetkey 9/24/2001) Actor 'Would Probably Have Died' if Filming Took Place - Chan will later tell the Hong Kong newspaper Oriental Daily News, "Filming was scheduled to have taken place at 7:00 a.m. [on September 11] and... I had to be at the top of one of the towers for one of the scenes." (ABC News 9/19/2001; Empire 9/19/2001) The scene, Chan will say, was going to be filmed at the "Top of the World restaurant." (Moore 9/27/2002)

Presumably he is referring to Windows on the World, the restaurant at the top of the North Tower. Everyone who is in Windows on the World when Flight 11 hits the North Tower at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) will subsequently die. (NPR 9/11/2003) Chan will comment, "I would probably have died if the shooting had gone ahead as planned." Today's filming at the WTC has been canceled, reportedly because the script for the scene that would have been filmed is late. (ABC News 9/19/2001; Empire 9/19/2001) "The action was good, but, somehow, the script not ready," Chan will say. Actor Is in Canada for Another Film - Instead of doing the scene for Nosebleed, Chan is in Toronto, Canada, where filming began the previous day for another movie he is starring in. That movie, The Tuxedo, is an action-comedy that Steven Spielberg is involved in producing. Chan will say of The Tuxedo, "I only did this movie because Steven Spielberg asked me himself." (Tourtellotte 6/17/2001; Bickley 7/11/2001; Moore 9/27/2002) He will recall learning of the attacks in New York during filming, saying: "After the first shot, I turned around and everyone was looking at one monitor, and nobody had responded to me. They said, 'Jackie, a plane crashed into the World Trade Center.' Then we saw the second plane crash. We knew it was a terrorist attack and everyone started crying." Chan will add, "The whole day I was like a walking dead man." (Klass 9/23/2002) Actor Learned 'Secrets' of the WTC in Preparation for Film - Chan has done a lot of groundwork for Nosebleed. "We had visited the [WTC] before September 11," he will recall. "The producer. My manager. We had dinner upstairs. We were getting all kinds of information. I was going to play a window washer, so they were telling me things like how many windows the building had." Chan has therefore learned "the 'secrets' of the towers—how air pressure was regulated with doors that might be useful as gags in one of his trademark fights—which sides of the buildings one could work on to avoid the wind," according to the Orlando Sentinel. (Moore 9/27/2002; Denerstein 9/28/2002) Production of Nosebleed will be canceled as a result of the 9/11 attacks. (Aberman 10/24/2001; Hoberman 12/4/2001)

The Vice President's Residence. [Source: David Bohrer/ White House]

Just before 7:00 a.m., Vice President Dick Cheney sits in the library of the vice president's residence at the Naval Observatory in Washington, DC, for his regular CIA briefing. His solo briefing is more detailed than the president's because he asks for more material. According to journalist and author Stephen Hayes, the briefing is "unremarkable." Cheney typically sets off for the three-mile drive to the White House at 7:30 a.m. He usually joins the president for his intelligence briefing, but with Bush away in Florida, there is no briefing at the White House on this day. (Hayes 2007, pp. 327-328) According to David Kuo, a special assistant to the president, Cheney arrives at the White House at just after 7:00 a.m. this morning. Kuo will later recall that Cheney "looked like an absentminded professor, deep in thought, oblivious to the world." (Kuo 2006, pp. 183)

A three-minute call is made from a payphone at Boston's Logan Airport, in the gate area from where Flight 175 will later depart, to 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta's cell phone. The 9/11 Commission will report, "We presume Shehhi [i.e., hijacker Marwan Alshehhi] made the call, but we cannot be sure." According to the commission, this is Atta and Alshehhi's final conversation. (9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 1, 451; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 4)

According to other reports, though, they later speak again briefly by cellphone while waiting for their planes to take off (see (Before 7:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (van Natta, and Zernike 11/4/2001; Elliot 8/4/2002)

According to an article on the conservative news website WorldNetDaily, alleged lead 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta almost misses Flight 11 and has to rush to the departure gate at Boston's Logan Airport. The article is based on the account of an unnamed American Airlines employee at Logan, and claims Atta is running late because his connecting flight from Portland was delayed (see (6:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001).

However, the 9/11 Commission claims that this plane was "on time," and says Atta is observed at Logan with Abdulaziz Alomari, asking for directions in a parking lot (see 6:45 a.m. September 11, 2001).

The employee says that at the baggage check-in, when asked security questions, Atta claims he does not speak English. A supervisor is called for, who just sends him towards the departure gate, as it is close to his plane's take-off time. Atta rushes through the security checkpoint, then down to the gate, where he shows up perspiring. The employee comments, "The nitwit. You know, they'd been planning it for five years, and he's running late for the flight." An American Airlines spokeswoman will refuse to comment on this account, saying all American employees have been ordered not to speak to the press. (Sperry 9/21/2001; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 3, 5)

According to later reports, the alarm system in WTC 7 is placed on "TEST" status for a period due to last eight hours. This ordinarily happens during maintenance or other testing, and any alarms received from the building are generally ignored. (National Institute of Standards and Technology 6/2004, pp. 28 pdf file)

During this period, all five Flight 11 hijackers check in at Boston's Logan Airport and board their plane, bound for Los Angeles. The FAA has a program in place called the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), which is designed to identify those passengers most likely requiring additional scrutiny by airport security (see (6:20 a.m.-7:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001).

Ticket records will show that CAPPS selects three of the Flight 11 hijackers at Logan: Since Waleed Alshehri checks no bags his selection has no consequences; Wail Alshehri and Satam Al Suqami have their bags scanned for explosives, but are not stopped. All five hijackers would need to pass through a security checkpoint to reach the departure gate for their flight. Each would have been screened as they walked through a metal detector calibrated to detect items with at least the metal content of a small-caliber handgun. If they'd set this off, they would have been screened with a handheld metal detector. An X-ray machine would have screened their carry-on luggage. However, Logan Airport has no video surveillance of its security checkpoints (see 1991-2000), so there is no documentary evidence of exactly when they pass through them, or if alarms are triggered. According to the 9/11 Commission, none of the checkpoint supervisors later recall seeing any of the Flights 11 hijackers, or report anything suspicious having occurred. (9/11 Commission 1/27/2004; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 1-2; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 5-6)

However, a WorldNetDaily article will claim that some Logan staff members recall seeing Mohamed Atta (see (6:50 a.m.-7:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Sperry 9/21/2001)

The Boston Globe will later comment, "aviation specialists have said it is unlikely that more rigorous attention to existing rules would have thwarted the 10 hijackers who boarded two jets at Logan on Sept. 11. At the time, the knives and box-cutters they were carrying were permitted." (Carroll 10/17/2001)

Flight 11 hijackers Waleed Alshehri, Wail Alshehri, and Satam Al Suqami arrive at Boston's Logan Airport in a rental car, which they park in the airport's central parking lot. (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 5)

An unidentified man who arrives at Logan Airport at "about 6:30 a.m." for an early flight has an argument with several Middle Eastern men over a parking space, before moving on, according to the News of the World. Some early press reports will say his confrontation is with five men. (Hayward, Farmer, and Macero 9/12/2001; Fenton and Ball 9/13/2001; ABC News 9/14/2001; News of the World 9/16/2001)

However, the 9/11 Commission will later describe the incident differently. It will say there are just three Middle Eastern men, and the man ends up parked next to them. One of the Middle Eastern men opens his car door to get out and then spends time "fiddling with his things," thus trapping the man in his car. Eventually the man has to force his way out, but the Middle Eastern men are completely unresponsive to him, saying nothing. The man will report the incident to authorities after hearing of the attacks. However, whether he identifies the men as Flight 11 hijackers is unstated. The hijackers' car, which is associated with either Wail or Waleed Alshehri, will be found in the lot later in the day of 9/11. (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 85)

Authorities will find Arabic-language flight training manuals inside the Mitsubishi rental. (Harpaz 9/12/2001; Hayward, Farmer, and Macero 9/12/2001; Fenton and Ball 9/13/2001)

Hijacker Ziad Jarrah phones his girlfriend, Aysel Senguen, about an hour before he boards Flight 93, according to the Los Angeles Times. Senguen is currently recovering from a minor operation in a hospital in Germany, where she lives. (Williams 10/23/2001; Bennett 8/22/2004)

Senguen will later recount: "[H]e was very brief. He said he loved me three times. I asked what was up. He hung up shortly afterwards.... It was so short and rather strange him saying that repeatedly." (Blenkinsop 11/19/2002; Vasagar 11/20/2002)

Some accounts will say Jarrah makes this call from his hotel, the Days Inn in Newark. Other accounts will claim he makes it from a payphone at Newark Airport, although he does not actually check in at the airport until later on, at 7:39 a.m. (PBS 1/17/2002; 9/11 Commission 7/24/2004, pp. 532; Bennett 8/22/2004; Crichton 8/22/2004; 9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 35)

The Portland-to-Boston flight used by 9/11 hijackers Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari arrives on time at Boston's Logan Airport. (Der Spiegel 2002)

Atta and Alomari then cross a parking lot on their way to the departure terminal for Flight 11, and are observed asking for directions. The other three Flight 11 hijackers arrive at Logan Airport in a rented car around this same time (see (6:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (9/11 Commission 8/26/2004, pp. 5)

The Colony Beach and Tennis Resort, where Bush stays the night before 9/11. [Source: Colony Beach and Tennis Resort]

President Bush goes for a four-mile jog around the golf course at the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort. (Balz and Woodward 1/27/2002; Sammon 10/7/2002; MSNBC 10/27/2002)