September 11, 2001 Research & Archives

At 9:58, a frantic passenger called from a bathroom to report an explosion and smoke. The tape of this 911 call was seized by the FBI. The 911 operator who took the call, Glenn Cramer, was told by the FBI not to discuss the call.

Barbara Olson's calls: Barbara Olson allegedly placed two calls to her husband, Ted Olson, at some time between 9:16 and 9:26. The only known evidence of these calls are statements by Olson, the first on September 12th

Renee May's phone call: Flight attendant Renee May used a cell phone to call her mother at 9:12. May's mother then called American Airlines to inform them that the flight has been hijacked.

Peter Burton Hanson's phone calls: Passenger Peter Burton Hanson called his father and reported details of the hijacking starting at 8:52. Hanson made several calls as he was cut off several times.

 

Flight attendant Betty Ong called Vanessa Minter at American Airlines reservations at 8:21, and talked for 23 minutes, until the plane crashed. Nydia Gonzalez also listened in from 8:27. The FBI refused to release a recording of the first 4-1/2 minutes of the conversation, but during the 9/11 Commission's January 27, 2004 hearing, the recording was played

Flight attendant Sweeney placed a cell phone call to American Airlines flight services office, and reached her friend, services manager Michael Woodward, starting at 8:21 and talked for 25 minutes, until the plane crashed. Sweeney related many details such as wounds by victims of the hijackers to seat numbers of the hijackers. 3   There are conflicting reports on whether the call was recorded.

Secret Service agents evacuate Vice President Dick Cheney and his aides from his office to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, a Cold War-era bunker beneath the White House.

Flight 93 is hijacked above northern Ohio, turning to the southeast. At 09:28, FAA Cleveland Center controller John Werth heard "sounds of possible screaming" coming from Flight 93 and noticed that the plane had descended 700 feet. At the time, Werth knew that some passenger jets were missing and that one had hit the World Trade Center in New York. At 09:32, he heard a voice saying "We have a bomb on board" and told his supervisor who then notified FAA Headquarters. At 09:36, FAA Cleveland called FAA Command Center at Herndon to ask whether the military had been notified – FAA Command Center told Cleveland that "FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue". At 09:49, the decision about whether to call the military had still not been made, and no one from the FAA called NEADS until 10:07, four minutes after Flight 93 had crashed near Shanksville, PA. Werth later commented:

Within three or four minutes, probably, of when it happened, I asked if the military was advised yet. Had anybody called the military? They said, "don't worry, that's been taken care of," which I think to them meant they had called the command center in Washington."

Dennis Fritz, director of the municipal airport in Johnstown, Pa., said the FAA called him several times as the plane approached his city, and even warned him to evacuate the tower for fear the jet would crash into it.

Had Flight 93 made it to Washington, D.C., Air National Guard pilots Lieutenant Colonel Marc H. Sasseville and Lieutenant Heather "Lucky" Penney were prepared to ram their unarmed F-16 fighters into it, perhaps giving their lives in the process.

Flight 77 is hijacked above southern Ohio, turning to the southeast. American Airlines Flight 77 took off from Dulles International Airport outside Washington D.C. at 08:20. The last transmission from the flight took place at 08:50:51. The flight proceeded normally until 08:54, when the aircraft deviated from its assigned course by initiating a turn to the south. Two minutes later, at 08:56, the plane's transponder was switched off, and its primary radar track was lost. Later, after hearing about the hijacked planes hitting the World Trade Center, Indianapolis Center suspected that Flight 77 may also have been hijacked, and shared this information with FAA Command Center at Herndon, where staff contacted FAA Headquarters in Washington at 09:25.

NEADS learned that the flight was lost at 9:34 during a phone call with the FAA Headquarters.

Washington Center: "Now let me tell you this. I – I'll – we've been looking. We're – also lost American 77 ... They lost contact with him. They lost everything. And they don't have any idea where he is or what happened."

The FAA did not contact NEADS to make this report. This phone call was initiated by NEADS in an attempt to locate Phantom Flight 11 (see previous).

At 09:35, Colin Scoggins from the FAA's Boston Center again called NEADS to inform them that they had located an aircraft, which later turned out to be Flight 77, heading toward Washington D.C. at a high speed. Two minutes later, a NEADS radar technician spotted a target he believed to be Flight 77. This radar target was in fact Flight 77, but the target vanished as soon as it was discovered. NEADS officials urgently ordered the fighters from Langley to be sent to Washington immediately, but the Pentagon was struck at 09:37:46. The Langley fighters were still 150 miles away.

Flight 175 is hijacked above Albany, New York, about 140 miles north of New York City, turning south. United Airlines Flight 175 departed Logan Airport at 08:14 also bound for Los Angeles just like Flight 11. At 08:42, when Flight 175's pilots sent their last radio transmission, the aircraft's transponder was at that time transmitting the assigned code. Five minutes later, the transponder code changed twice, the first indication that the plane had been hijacked, although air traffic controllers would not notice for several more minutes. As word began spreading about the hijacking of Flight 11, air traffic controller David Bottiglia and other controllers searched the radar, looking for Flight 11. At 08:51, he noticed that Flight 175 had changed its transponder. He asked another controller to take over all of his other planes.

Bottiglia tried six times to contact Flight 175 between 08:51 and 08:55, with no response. The aircraft deviated from its assigned altitude at 08:51, and began its turn toward New York City at 08:52. At 08:55, Bottiglia told a manager at FAA New York Center that he thought Flight 175 had been hijacked. According to the 9/11 Commission report, this manager then "tried to contact regional managers but was told that they were discussing hijacked aircraft (presumably Flight 11) and refused to be disturbed." At around this time, Flight 175 flew within about 200 feet of Delta Air Lines Flight 2315, bound from Bradley to Tampa, Florida.

In the final moments before impact, according to eyewitness and Newark air traffic controller Rick Tepper, Flight 175 executed ".. a hard right bank, diving very steeply and very fast. As he was coming up the Hudson River, he made another hard left turn..." One or two minutes before it crashed into the World Trade Center, Flight 175 narrowly avoided a mid-air collision with Midwest Airlines Flight 7 (Midex 7). At 09:01, a New York Center manager called FAA Command Center at Herndon. NEADS was notified at 09:03, when the New York Center manager called them directly, at about the time that Flight 175 hit the South Tower. The F-15s were still 20 minutes away from Manhattan when United Airlines Flight 175 smashed into the WTC's south tower.

Although NORAD knew of no other hijacked aircraft, a precautionary measure was taken by ordering fighters at Langley Air Force Base to battle stations.